United States v. Mazurie by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Supreme Court Case Files Powell Papers
10-1974
United States v. Mazurie
Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Powell Papers at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
U.S. v. Mazurie. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 21. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee
University School of Law, Virginia.
Court 
CA - 10 
Voted on ................... , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 . . . 
UNITED STATES, Petitioner 
vs. 
MARTIN DEWALT MAZURIE, ET AL. 
12/28/73 - Cert. filed. 
JURISDICTIONAL NOT HOLD 
FOR 
CERT. MERITS MOTION AB-
1-----r--t---S,-T_A_T_E,M_E_N_T,..---t----,---t--.---lSENT VOT-
o D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF 0 D lNG 
v 
Rehnquist, J ................. . 
Powell, J .................... . 
Blackmun, J . ................ . 
·· ; ···· ~ ······· .. . 
:-! .. :;; ....................... . 
:; : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~ 
Marshall, J . ................. . 
White, J ..................... . 
Stewart, J ................... . 
Brennan, J ................... . 
Douglas, J .................... . 
Burger, Ch. J . ............... . 
::-/ ···························· 
... ........ ······c· ·:... .. ··~····· ..... / .... ······ -r~ -- 7 .. . :; .'( ...... ...... ~ ............ . 
::::1.:::::::::::::::::::::::: 
No. 73-1018 
Qr ('tt.'l\-\ ~ '>\.~ .Q. 
&\ \f»}lf'( 
\ . "--
Conf. Feb. 22, 1974 





Cert. to CA 10 
(Lewis, Seth, Holloway) 





~The CA 10 opinion was rendered on November 8, 1973, and the petjtion 
was filed on December 28, 1973. Thus the petition is 20 days non-
jurisdictionally out-of-time. The motion to file a late brjef says 
that the Land and Natural Resources Division of the Department of 
Justice, "which normally handles civil cases," did not call the case 
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case was already untimely. The motion stresses the importance of 
the case to the Indians and says that they should not be made to 
pay for a Government blunder. 
1. After a nonjury trial in USDC (D. Wyo, J. Kerr) resps were 
convicted of violating 18 u.s.c. 1154 (see appendix to this memo). 
The conviction was reversed by the CA 10, however, principally on 
vagueness grounds but with an additional suggestion that the Govern-
ment and the Indians lacked the power to make resps' conduct a crjme. 
The U.S. attacks this decision across the board. 
2. FACTS: There is little debate about the facts. In brief, 
resps operate the Blue Bull Bar on .land patented in fee to t~eir 
predecessor by the United States but located within the boundarjes 
of the Wind River Indian Reservation. They hold a liquor license 
from the State of Wyoming but none from the two occupying Indian 
tribes, the Arapahoe and Shoshone. Until 1971 no such license was 
required and the grant of the state license sufficed to allow resps 
to sell liquor on their land. At that time the Tribes passed an 
ordinance, duly published in the Federal Register, which made such 
a license mandatory for sales within the reservation. 
Resps then sought a license but were turned down. According 
to the petition the bar remained closed for a short period after the 
denial, but resps subsequently resumed ·business without the tribal 
license. This prosecution resulted. 
-3-
3. OPINIONS BELOW: The USDC concluded that resps' land was 
within Indian Country, as defined by 18 u.s.c. 1154, and that resps 
I 
were therefore subject to federal law. The court further found that ,, 
the Wind River Tribes had passed an ordinance requiring a license in 
' conformity with 18 u.s.c. 1161, and that resps had nevertheless so+d 
liquor on the reservation without a license from the tribes. This 
was enough for conviction. 
The CA 10 in a somewhat muddled effort reversed. According 
to the Court of Appeals the important question was whether resps' 
land fell within the definition of "fee-patented lands in non-Indian 
communi ties." If not1 the Government had failed to prove an essential 
element of the crime. The court then stated (italics theirs): "The 
./ 
proof in the record herein of this element of the crime is inconclusive 
and indefinite." The problem, according to the court, was that there 
were no standards for determining what a "community" was, no standards 
for determining what a "non-Indian" community was (i.e. what percentage 
of Indians), and no standards for determining what an "Indian" was 
(i.e. what percentage of Indian blood). The court concluded: 
"We must hold that the terminology of 'non-Indian community' 
is not capable of sufficiently precise definition to serve as an 
element of the crime herein considered, aside from other factors 
or elements with similar infirmities. The statute is thus 
fatally defective by reason of this indefinite and vague termi-
nology." 
The CA supported this result by referring to United States v. 
National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, and Connally v. General 









cannot be required to guess at the statutes meaning nor should reasonable 
men differ as to its application. Furthermore, the court seemed to say, 
the USDC erred by requiring resps to show that they were within the 
exception to the definition instead of requiring the prosecution to 
show that the definition fit them. See Gruenwald v. United States, 
353 u.s. 391. 
The court also questioned the "authority of the Government or 
of the Tribes to regulate the defendants' business in a way that a 
failure to conform constitutes a crime." (emphasis theirs). The court 
expressed doubt about whether the Government could regulate a business 
,-
on .land it granted in fee and stated positively that any such power, 
should it exist, could not be delegated to the Indians. The Jndians 
were merely a voluntary association of citizens with no authority 
over persons(ineligible for membership)on their own lands. Cases 
~ 
discussing the sovereignty of Indian tribes were distinguished as 
being in the "context of relationships between a Tribe and the federal 
or state government." As the court stated: "Congress cannot delegate 
its authority to a private,. voluntary organization, which is obviously 
not a governmental agency, to regulate a business on privately-owned 
lands, no matter where located." 
4. CONTENTIONS: 
(1) Petr urges that the CA 10 opinion, far from following 
National Dairy Corp., supra, is inconsistent with it. Here the 
resps had ample warning that their conduct would violate the law 
' 
-5- I 
because federal officials had told them to secure a license or face 
prosecution. Re sp tried and failed to comply. In a case not involv-
ing First Amendme nt rights the notice in the actual case before t he 
court is the relevant factor. These defendants knew they were 
violating the law. 
Furthermore there was no basis for thinking that the Blue 
Bull Bar could come within the exception, almost no matter what 
definition was adopted. The bar was about three-quarters of a mile 
from Fort Washakie which apparently is the leading Indian community 
in the area. Resps mightbe able to argue that they were not part of 
this community, but they could not establish any other community to 
be part of. According to the Government the nearest non-Indian com-
munity (by some unexplained definition) was 15 miles away. 
(2) The Government also claims a conflict with Buster v. 
Wright, 135 F. 947 (CA 8), where theCA 8 held that Indian tribes 
had inherent authority "to license and tax non-Indians conducting 
business on fee patented land within the exterior boundaries of 
their reservations.'' (petn., p. 15). TheCA lO's holding to the 
contrary ignores a line of cases holding that Indian tribes are 
governmental units with various sovereign powers. 
(3) Finally petr urges that the suggestion that Congress 
could not regulate liquor sales on private lands within an Indian 
reservation is contrary to Perrin v. United States, 232 u.s. 478. 
The Constitution, art I, sec. 8, (authorizing Congress to regulate 
·~ 
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" commerce "with the Indian Tribes") is a sufficient grant of power. 
Respondents' contentions: Resps merely say that the liquor business 
I 
on Indian lands will not go unregulated because of this decision since 
state control will continue. Resps do not respond to the Governments 
substantive arguments at all. They do suggest that the petition's 
lack of timeliness should weigh heavily if not totally against it. 
There are three amicus briefs. T'.VO supporting the Govern-
ment emphasize the importance of Indians being able to regulate the 
liquor trade within their reservations. The third brief filed by 
the State of Wyoming on behalf of resps says that state licenses 
should not be rendered a nullity by Tribal action. 
5. DISCUSSION: 
(1) There is no question that resps knew their selling of 
liquor without a tribal license was considered by the federal govern-
ment and the Indians to violate 18 u.s.c. 1154. An unreasonable - ----------
interpretation by the authorities would not necessarily save an un-
fathomable statute, but the application of the statute to resps ---------------hardly seems arbitrary. The CA 10 mixed its vagueness discussion 
with observations which seemed to make the question more one of 
burden of proof. The court apparently felt the evidence did not 
show that resps were without the language of the exception. Accord-
ing to the government, resps failed to show any reason to believe 
the exception applied. (One resp in fact testified: "We are kind 
of out there by ourselves, you know.") Viewing the facts as stated 
. . 
-7-
in the two lower court opini.ons it is quite difficult to see how 
the phrase "non-Indian community" could apply here. 
(2) Buster v. Wright, supra, did hold that the Creek Indian 
Nation had authority to tax non-citizens of the Tribe for the privi-
lege of transacting business within its borders, despite the fact 
that the business was conducted on fee patented lands. The authority 
was said to be "one of the inherent and essential attributes of its 
original sovereignty." The CA 8 did note, however, that the power of 
the U.S. Government to permit others to trade on the lands without an 
Indian license was not at issue. One might argue that Buster does 
not control a case in which a state has applied its laws to land 
placed under state jurisdiction by the federal government and .the 
Indians have rendered the state law a nullity. 
{3} In Perrin v. United States, supra, the Court stated: 
"The power of Congress to prohibit the introduction of 
intoxicating liquors into an Indian reservation, wheresoever 
situate, and to prohibit traffic in such liquors with tribal 
Indians, whether upon or off a reservation and whether within 
or without the limits of a State, does not admit of any doubt." 
In that case Congress had imposed a restriction on ceded lands within 
the vicinity of lands retained by the Indians which prohibited sale 
of intoxicating liquors. The Court noted that Congress had broad 
discretion to control the sale of liquor even on lands merely proxi-
mate to Indian lands as part of its ,protective concern for the Indians. 
That decision seems broad enough to sustain the constitutionality of 
18 u.s.c. 1154. 
- . 
-8- I 
In general, I think the decision of the CA 10 seems wrong. 
The suggestion that the federal government and the Indians could not 
I \ 
regulate the sale of liquor near to Indian lands seems contrary to 
the tenor if not the actual holdings of earlier cases, and is not -
convincing. The vagueness argument also seems weak. Resps had notice 
that their conduct would be considered a crime and merely guessed 
wrong about the merits of their case. That does not seem to me to be 
a vagueness problem. I do not think it was improper to require the 
defendants to introduce persuasive evidence to bring themselves within 
the exception to the statutory definition once the sale within Indian 
boundaries was shown. 
There is a response. 
2/12/74 Farr USDC and CA ops in petn. 
. ~ 
.. . 
18 U .R.C. 1151 Jll'oddC"s in pr rtill('Jlt l> ~u:t : 
Exc·c·pt ns otlwnYi se prcn·i(h·cl in ~rr·ti'•~l:-: Jl!i-1 
and llGG of thi s title, tllr t r nn "Inrli< n c· oun-
try", as nsecl in thi s chaptrr, m ean=- ( a) all 
]and within tlw li111its of any Indi an r<·~c·rvn­
tion llllClcr tlJC jurisdic- ti on of th e "'Cnitc·J f:.itnt(' s 
GoY<' rnment, JJOtwith :-.;t:m dill~ the i:--:-1 ~~11c: c of 
any ]'latent, and, inC'lnclin ~ ri ght ~-of-v.-n :· nm-
. . * * * nino· thrmwh the 1·rscrYatwn · 
b b 
18 U.S.C. 11:5:1: pl'OYid es in p ertinent part: 
(a) ·>r * ·>r whoever introclnccs or attc>mpt .~ -to 
introduc-e any malt, spirHnou ~, or Yinons 1icpwr, 
including beer, ale, and ''inc, or any ardent or 
into:x ic-a ting licpJ or of any kj ncl ''"ha t:::oe,-eT into 
the Indian countr.r, Rhall, for the fir:-:;t offc-n~c , 
he fined not .more than $GOO or impri sonc>cl not 
more than one year, or both; and, f or each 
snbseqnc-nt of-fense>, he fined not more than 
$2,000 or impriSOJ)ecl not more than fin' y ea1·s, 
or both. 
* . * * 
(c) The term "Indian country" as usecl in 
this scctjon docs not inrlndc fre -patrntecl buds 
in non-Indian comnmniti es or rights-of-way 
through Indian rcserYation ~, and thi:-) sett ion 
does not apply to such Junds or rights-of-,yay 
in the nh:)enc·e of a treaty or statute extending 
the Indian liquor laws thereto. 
18 U.S.C. 11G1 provides : 
rrhe proYi sions of sections 115:1:, 115G, 3113, 
3488, and 3G18, of thit) title, shall not appl.v 
wi01in ~my arra .that is not Indian country, nor 
to nny act or hnnsac-tion within any nrra of 
lnclian c·otult ry JWoYidrd sndt ad or trnn ~a<.- ~ ion 
is in eonfol'miiy both "·ith the ]a"·s of the ~t~1t e 
in whic·h sll(·h :wt or transac-t ic)}} oc·rm·s ~md 
wiih :m on1inantc dnl)' adop1t'd h~· th r t .-ihc 
Jw.Yi11g j nri sc1 ittion on·r snth a l'ra of I1 ~..ian 
c·.mmh.r, tcrtifird hy the· S<.' c·rrtnry of the Iq-




TO: Mr. Justice Powell DATE: November 7, 1974 
FROM: Joel Klein 
No. 73-1018, U.S. v. Mazurie 
This is a relatively trivial case involving the question 
of whether Congress can authorize the Indian tribes to license 
the sale of liquor in taverns that are located on small, 
'--
privately-owned, enclaves on the Indian reservation. CAlO, 
in effect, said no. My own thinking is that CAlO ought to be 
reversed. 
can 
I/see no constitutional objection to a statute allowing 
the Indians to decide who will sell liquor on or near an 
Indian community. Congress traditionally has been allowed 
great latitude under its constitutional authority to regulate 
commerce with the Indians. CAlO's first claim- that the 
definition of "non-Indian community" is vague - is silly, 
particularly in this case where the defendant was well-apprised 
that he was violating the law and where no First Amendment 
rights are at stake. CAlO, in free-floating fashion, also 
suggested that perhaps Congress was without authority to 
~Co~ 
regulate in this area and, in any event,( could not delegate 
that authority to the Indians. But this Court has repeatedly 
held that Congress may regulate the sale of liquor to Indians, 
even on non-Indian land. E.g., Perrin v. U.S., 232 U.S. 478. 
2. 
Nor is there anything to the delegation point. There is little 
left to the doctrine of "unconstitutional delegation," and, in 
general, Congress permissibly delegates much authority to the 
Indians. Thus, there are no serious constitutional questions 
here. 
There is, however, a non-constitutional ground on which 
to~ CAlO's decision. The CA, reversing a finding of 
USDC without acknowledging the reversal, held that the govern-
ment had failed to prove that respondent was not located in 
a "non-Indian" community. Thus the government did not establish 
a jurisdictional element of the crime. It seems to me, however, 
that USDC, not CAlO, is correct on this factual issue. There 
can be no serious contention that respondent's tavern was in 
a non-Indian community since approximatel1 80% of the 200 
-families living within 20 square miles of the tavern are 
Indians. I would, therefore, reverse CAlO's reversal of ( 
USDC on the ground that USDC's finding of fact was not clearly 
erroneous. 
Although I recommend reversal, I can understand why CAlO 
was troubled. Respondent is licensed by the state and 
operating on his own land. It seems a bit unfair to require 
him to get a license from the Indians as well. Perhaps what 
is most offensive abovt: the scheme is that the Indians 
can, without any review, discriminate against non-Indians, 
such as respondent, in the granting of licenses. Nevertheless, 
Congress' power in this area has been exceptionally broad, 
and to affirm CAlO would require swimming upstream for far 
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CHAMBERS O F 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~upuntt <!f!tllrlof tlrt ~b .§htttg 
~ag lfingLm. ~. Q]. 2ll&f'! ~ 
December 20, 1974 
73-1018- U. S. v. Mazurie 
Dear Bill, 
I agree with your opinion for the 
Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
() (' 
I ' > ' 
' 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 





JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS December 21, 1974 
Dear Bill: 
In . 73-1018, U.S. v. MAZURIE I 
voted the other way though at the time 
the case seemed marginal. I will however 
acquiese in your opinion. If there is 
a dissent, I will of course take another 
look. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 





. -------------(. ,,I L· ~~-
William ~Douglas 
'l'o 'fhe Chief Justice 
ltr . Justice Douglas 
Mr . Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
M:r . Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
"1r . Justice Powell 
3rd DRAFT 
From: Rehnquist, J. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STl\f~ated: ___ _ 
Recirculated: /.t-z 9;; ./ 
No. 73-1018 
United States Petitioner ) On Writ of Certiorari to 
v.' ' the United States Court 
M t . D It M . t 1 of Appeals for the Tenth ar m ewa azune e a . c· 't 
lrCUl • 
[December -, 1974] 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The respondents were convicted of introducing spiritu-
ous beverages into Indian country, in violation of 18 
U. S. C. § 1154.1 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit reversed. United States v. Mazurie, 487 F. 2d 14 
(1973). We granted certiorari, 415 U.S. 947 (1974), in 
order to consider the Solicitor General's contentions that 
18 U. S. C. § 1154 is not unconstitutionally vague, that 
Congress has the constitutional authority to control the 
sale of alcoholic beverages by non-Indians on fee-patented 
1 "18 U. S. C. § 1154 provides in pt>rtinent part: 
"(a) ... whoever introduces or attempts to introduce nny malt, 
spirituous, or vinous liquor, meluding beer, ale, und wint>, or any 
:.mlent or intoxicating liquor of any kind whatsoever into the Indmn 
country, shall, for the first ofi'Pnse, be fined not more than $500 or 
imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and, for each sub-
seqnPnt offPnsc, be fined not more than $2,000 or Imprisoned not 
more than five years, or both. 
" (c) The term "Indi:m countr.:" R'l used in this section doeH not 
include fee-patented land::; in non ·Indian communities or rights-of-
way through Indian re~ervatiom;, and this section does not apply to 
such land:; or rights-of-way in th<' ·~b~l'nce of a treaty or statute 
extending the Indian liquor laws thrrcto." 
T T 
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land within the boundaries of an Indian reservation, and 
that Congress could validly make a delegation of this 
authority to a reservation's tribal council. We reverse 
the Court of Appeals. 
I 
The Wind River Reservation was established by treaty 
in 1868. Located in a rather arid portion of central 
Wyoming, at least some of its 2,300,000 acres have been 
described by Justice Cardozo as "fair and fertile," Sho-
shone Tribe v. United States, 299 U. S. 476, 486 (1937). 
It straddles the Wind River, with its remarkable canyon, 
and lies in a mile-high basin at the foot of the Wind River 
Mounta~ns, whose rugged, glaciated peaks and ridges form 
a portion of the Continental Divide.2 The reservation is 
occupied by the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes. Al-
though these tribes were once "ancestral foes," Shoshone 
Tribe v. United States, supra, at 486, they are today 
jointly known as the Wind River Tribes. As a result of 
various patents, substantial tracts of non-Indian held land 
are scattered within the reservation's boundaries. It was 
on such non-Indian land that respondents Martin and 
Margaret Mazurie operated their bar, which did business 
under the corporate name of The Blue Bull, Inc. 
Before 1953 federal law generally prohibited the in-
troduction of alcoholic beverages into "Indian country." 
18 U.S. C.§ 1154 (a). "Indian country" was defined by 
18 U. S. C. § 1151 to include non-Indian held lands 
"within the limits of any Indian reservation." 3 In 1949, 
2 F. Harmston, Wind River Basin 2 (1953); H. Granger, et al., 
Mineral Resources of the Glacier Primitive Area, Wyoming, Geo-
logical Survey Bull. No. 1319-F, F2-95 (1971). 
8 "18 U. S. C. § 1151 provides in pertinent part: 
"Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this 
title, the term "Indian country," as used in this chapter, means 




UNITED STATES v. MAZURIE 3 
the term was given a narrower meaning, insofar as rele .. 
vent to the liquor prohibition, so as to exclude both 
fee-patented lands within ~<non-Indian comrnunitie~and 
rights-of-way through reservations.• Act of May 24, 
1949, 63 Stat. 89, 94, 18 U. S. C. § 1154 (c), supra, n. 1. 
The quoted term is not defined, a fact which creates prob-
lems with which we shall shortly deal. In 1953 Congress 
passed local option legislation allowing Indian tribes, with 
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to regulate 
the introduction of liquor into Indian country, so long as 
state law was not violated. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 
586, 18 U. S.C. § 1161:' The Wind River Tribes responded 
to this option by adopting an ordinance which permitted 
liquor sales on the reservation if made in accordance with 
Wyoming law. When The Blue Bull originally opened, 
a liquor license had been issued to it by Fremont County, 
Wyoming, and its operation was therefore consistent with 
that tribal ordinance. But in 1971 the Wind River Tribes 
adopted a new liquor ordinance, Ordinance No. 26.5 
That ordinance required that retail liquor outlets within 
Indian country obtain both tribal and state licenses. 
In 1972, the Mazuries applied for a tribal license, after 
juriEdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through 
the reservation .... " 
4 "18 U. S. C. § 1161 provides: 
"The proviswns of sections 1154, 1156, 3113, 3488, and 3618, of 
thi~ title, shall not apply w1t bin any area that is not Indian country, 
nor to any act or transaction within any ar&'t of Indian country 
provided such act or transaction is in conformity both with the laws 
of thr Stnte in which such act or transaction occurs and with an 
ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over sucl1 
area of Indian country, certified by the Secretary of the Interior, 
and pnbliHhcd in the Frderal Register." 
5 Tho ordinance was properly approved by the Secretary of the 
Interior and pnhlished in the Feqcrul Register. 37 Fed. Reg. 1253-




4 UNITED STATES v. MAZURIE 
warnings that they would be subject to criminal charges 
if they continued to operate without one. The Tribes 
held a public hearing which Martin Mazurie and the Ma-
zuries' lawyer attended. Witnesses protested grant of 
the license, complaining of singing and shooting at late 
hours, disturbances of elderly residents of a nearby hous-
ing development, and the permitting of Indian minors in 
the bar. The application was denied. 
Thereafter, the Mazuries closed The Blue Bull. Three 
weeks later they reopened it. It remained in operation 
for approximately a year, until federal officers seized its 
alcoholic beverages and this criminal prosecution was 
initiated.6 
The case was tried to the District Court without a jury. 
Since most of the factual issues were disposed of by stipu-
lations/ the testimony at trial primarily dealt with 
whether the bar was within "Indian country." On the 
basis of testimony about The Blue Bull's location, and 
about the racial composition of residents of the surround-
ing area, the court concluded that the bar was so located. 
Holding that federal authority could reach non-Indians 
located on privately held land within a reservation's 
boundaries, the Court entered a judgment of conviction. 
Each respondent was fined $100. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. It 
concluded that the prosecution had not carried its burden 
u The Blur Bull wa~ rt-opened after the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. In April 1974, however, Fremont County refused to renew 
it;; lieen~r and it wa:-: again clo~ed. Brief for Petitioner 5, n 4; Brief 
for Respondent 20, n. 8. 
7 It waH stipulated that Thr Blue Bull wn~ bring operated without 
the licem;e required by Ordinance No. 26, that alcoholic beverages 
had been sold at The Blue Bull, that The Blue Bull was located 
within the Wind River Reservation, but on land which it owned in 
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of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the bar was 
not excluded from Indian country by the § 1154 (c) ex-
ception for "fee-patented lands in non-Indian com-
munities." 8 This· conclusion was tied directly to the 
more basic holding that: 
"[T]he terminology of 'non-Indian community' is not 
capable of sufficiently precise definition to serve as 
s The Di~trict Court did not make a specific finding of faci thai 
The Blue Bull was not located in a non-Indian community. The 
court did find that it was in "Indian Country" (Petjtion, at 35), 
that it was ~ituated "at a site known us Fort Washakie, Wyoming" I 
(Petition, at 3-!), that "Fort Washakie is not an incorporated non-
Indian community with recognized boundaries" (Petition, at 34) , and 
that tht> bar had been opt>rated in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1154 
(whirh contains the exclusion from "Indian country" of fee-patented 
lnnds in non-Indinn communities). The nmbiguity in the trial court's 
findings is readily explained by rt>spondents' failure to focu~ on 1 he 
issue at trial. The nature of defrnse testimony and cross-rxnmination 
is discussed below, pp. 7-8. That respondents failed to contest 
the issue is further established by their motion to dismiss at the 
close of the Government's eviden~e. ' The basis of the motion was 
failure "to prove beyond a doubt that [respondents] are operating 
in an Indian community" (emphasis added), App., at 64, which even 
if true is plainly irrelevant under the wording of§ 1154 (c). Respond-
ents' counsel then proceeded with an argument based on respondents' 
unrestricted fee ownership of the property on which the bar was 
located. Ibid. In addition, respondents' counsel did not dispute 
(,he court's statement at the close of the trial that, the "sole issue" 
was "whether or not the Tribal Council has jurisdiction over 
deeded land held by these parties in fee .... " Record, Vol. II, p. 140. 
The court went. on to state that, 
"it is in Indian Country. 'fhere is not any question. You do not 
need to cite a single case that this bar and this ten acres is located 
in Indian Country. I am not saying it is Indian land, but it is 
fndian Country." Ibid . 
Again, respondents ' counsel made no objection. He also apparently 
did not seek to focus the court's attention on the issue by filing either 
a post-trial brief or proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law-while both parties had the opportunity to do so, only the 
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an element of the crime herein considered . . . . The 
statute is thus fatally defective by reason of this 
indefinite and vague terminology." 487 F. 2d, at 18. 
As a second basis for reversal, the court held that 
insofar as 18 U. S. C. § 1161 authorized Indian tribes to 
adopt ordinances controlling the introduction by non-
Indians of alcoholic beverages onto non-Indian land, it 
was an invalid congressional attempt to delegate author-
ity. The Court of Appeals also suggested that Congress 
itself could not regulate the sale of alcohol by non-Indians 
on fee-patented non-Indian lands within Indian 
reservations. 
II 
It is well established that vagueness challenges to. 
statutes which do not involve First Am~ndment freedoms 
must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at 
hand. United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 
372 U.S. 29 (1963). In determining whether§ 1154 (c) 
is unconstitutionally vague as to these defendants, we 
must therefore first consider the evidence as to the loca-
tion of the Blue BulP 
The evidence showed that the bar was located on the 
outskirts of Fort Washakie, Wyoming, an unincorporated' 
village bearing the name of the man who was Chief 
of the Shoshones during their early years on the Wind 
River Reservations. Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 
supra, at 486. H armsbn, supra, at 3-4. Fort Washakie 
9 We assumr, arguendo, as has the GovE'rnment in its arguments 
before this court, l hat thr prosecution has the burden of proving 
that the§ 1154 (c) statutory exceptions are not applicable. Because 
of this assumption, and because we conclude that the Government 
in any event did carry this burden, we need not consider whether 
the exeeptwn must be pleaded and proved by criminal defendants. 
Cf. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62, 70 (1971) (dealing with 
a crimiru1l statute in whicl1 "an <:>xception is incorporated in the· 
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is the ·location of the Wind River Agency of the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, and of the Tribal Headquarters of the 
Wind River Tribes. One witness testified that the village 
was an "Indian community." App., at 49. The evidence 
also showed that of the 212 families living within a 20-
square-mile area roughly centered on The Blue Bull, 170 
were Indian families, 41 were non-Indians, and one was 
mixed. A large-scale United States Geological Survey map 
was introduced to show the limits of this housing survey. 
It indicates that the survey included all settlements within 
the Fort Washakie area, and that the nearest not-in-
cluded concentrations of housing were at Saint James 
Church and Ethete, some four miles beyond the bound-
aries of the survey and some six miles from Fort Washakie. 
The evidence also established that the state school serving· 
Fort Washakie, and located about two and one-half miles 
from The Blue Bull, had a total enrollment of 243 stu-
dents, 223 of whom were Indian. 
Other evidence bearing on whether The Blue Bull was 
located in a non-Indian community was Martin Mazurie's. 
testimony that the bar served both Indians and non-
Indians, and that, "We are kind of out there by ourselves, 
you know." App., at 70. A transcript of the hearing on 
the Mazuries' application to the Tribes for a retail liquor 
license was also admitted at the trial. That transcript 
indicates that The Blue Bull was located near a public 
housing development populated largely if not entirely by 
Indians. Residents of this development complained that 
persons leaving the bar late at night, and for one reason 
or another having either no transportation or no destina-
tion, would wander into the development. 
There was no testimony that The Blue Bull was m a 
non-Indian community. The defense did obtain ac-
knowledgements by prosecution witnesses that they could 
not precisely state the boundaries of the Fort Washakie 








8 UNITED STATES v. MAZUIUE 
fense was directed at establishing tha,t the term "Indian" 
was without precise meaning, and that the State of Wyon-
ing generally had jurisdiction over non-Indians and their 
lands within the Reservation. 
We think that the foregoing evidence was sufficient to 
justify the District Court's implied conclusion that Fort 
Washakie and its surrounding settlements did not com-
prise a non-Indian community. We do not read the 
opinion of the Court of Appeals as reaching a conclusion 
contrary to that we hav~ just stated. That Court instead 
based its decision on the proposition that such proof did 
not go far enough, a view generated by its opinion of the 
requirements this statute must meet in order to avoid the 
vice of vagueness. The Court of Appeals was looking for 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of precisely defined con-
cepts of "Indian" and "community." We gather that it 
expected persons treated as "Indians" in the housing and 
school surveys to be proven to satisfy a specific statutory 
definition. Similarly, it apparently expected that proof 
concerning the "community" should have conformed to 
some specific statutory definition, presumably one keyed 
to a geographical area with precise boundaries. 
We believe that the Court of Appeals erred by holding 
that the Constitution requires proof of such precisely 
defined concepts. The prosecution was required to do no 
more than prove that The Blue Bull was not located in 
a non-Indian community, where that term has a meaning 
sufficiently precise for a man of average intelligence to 
"reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is 
proscribed." United States v. National Dairy Products 
Corp., supra, 372 U. S., at 32--33. Given the nature of 
The Blue Bull's location and surrounding population, the 
statute was sufficient to advise the Mazuries that their 
bar was not excepted from tribal regulation by virtue of 
being located in a non-Indian comrnunity.10 
10 We note that the § 1154 (c) excrption i::; availablr for fee-
73-1018-0PINION 
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III 
The Court of Appeals expressed doubt that "the Gov-
ernment has the power to regulate a business on the land 
it granted in fee without restrictions." 487 F. 2d, at 18. 
Because that Court went on to hold that even if Con-
gress did possess such power, it could not be delegated 
to an Indian tribe, that Court did not find it necessary to 
resolve the issue of congressional power. We do, how-
ever, reach the issue, because we hereinafter conclude that 
federal authotity was properly delegated to the Indian 
tribes. We conclude that federal authority is adequate, 
even though the lands were held in fee by non-Indians, 
and even though the persons regulated were non-Indians. 
Article I, § 8, of the Constitution gives Congress power 
"To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." This 
Court has repeatedly held that this clause affords Con-
gress the power to prohibit or regulate the sale of alcoholic 
beverages to tribal Indians, wherever situated, and to 
prohibit or regulate the introduction of alcoholic bever-
ages in to Indian country." United States v. Holliday, 3 
patPnted land~:< which are in non-Indian rommunities, rather than for 
those which are not in Indian communities. This fact renders irrele-
vant the inability of prosection witnesse~ to specif:t precise bound-
arie>< of thP Fort Washakie lndiw, community. 
We need not detain ourselve:; with an issue which seemed to cause 
the Court of Appeals ~ome difficulties, that of what qualifies a person 
ns an "Indian." The record phinly establishes that, in the circum-
stance,; of this ease, the distmction between Indians and non-Indians 
was generally understood. Those who testified about the housmg 
aud ~chool survey<> displayed no difficulty in making such classifi-
cations. Nor did Mr. Mazuric. He t!'stified that when there was 
trouble at h1s bar he would call the county sheriff to deal w1th a 
non-Indian, hut would call the Tribal Police to deal with an Indian. 
Wh<'n his counsel questioned lum ns to how he determined which 
was wh1ch, he simply replird, "Becau~e I knew thrm." App., at 70. 
11 lt 1:-; mHli~JHlted that tlw Wind Hivrr Tribr,.; haw not brPn 
emanctpate<l from Federal guardianship and control. Ther~ is thu~ 
73-1018-0PINION 
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Wall. 407, 417-418 (1865); United States v. Forty-three 
Gallons of Whiskey, 3 Otto 188, 194-195 (1876); Ex 
pm·te Webb, 225 U. S. 663, 683-684 (1912); Perrin v. 
United States, 232 U. S. 478, 482 (1914); Johnson v. 
Gearlds, 234 U. S. 422, 438-439 ( 1914); United States v. 
Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 597 (1916). 
Perrin v. United States, supra, demonstrates the con-
trolling principle. It dealt with the sale of intoxicating 
beverages within premises owned by non-Indians, on 
privately held land in an organized non-Indian munici-
pality. The land originally had been included in the 
Yankton Sioux Indian Reservation, but had been ceded 
to the United States. The cession agreement, as ratified 
and confirmed by Congress, specified that alcoholic bever-
ages would never be sold on the ceded land. The land 
was subsequently opened to private non-Indian settlers. 
In upholding Perrin's conviction, this Court stated: 
"The power of Congress to prohibit the introduction 
of intoxicating liquors into an Indian reservation, 
wheresoever situate, and to prohibit traffic in such 
liquors with tribal Indians, whether upon or off a 
reservation and whether within or without the limits· 
of a State, does not admit of any doubt. It arises 
in part from the clause in the Constitution investing 
Congress with authority 'to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian tribes,' and in part from the recog-
nized relation of tribal Indians to the Federal Gov-
ernment." 232 U. S., at 482. 
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U. S. 351 (1962), is a 
more recent indication of congressional authority over 
events occurring on non-Indian land within a reservation. 
no doubt that this ease is properly analyzed in terms of Congress,. 
t:xclw;ive constitutional authority to deal with Indian trib~, 
;• 
73-1018-0PINION 
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The case concerned an Indian's challenge to a state 
burglary conviction. The Indian contended that because 
the offense took place within "Indian country," it was 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States by 
virtue of 18 U. S. C. § 1153. This Court agreed, despite 
the fact that the crime occurred on land patented in fee 
to non-Indians. While the opinion did not address the 
constitutional issue, it did reject a variety of statutory 
arguments for excluding the crime's situs from 18 U.S. C. 
§ 1151's definition of "Indian country." Of significance 
for our purposes is the fact that Congress' authority to 
define "Indian country" so broadly, and to supersede 
state jurisdiction within the defined· area, went both 
unchallenged by the parties and unquestioned by this 
Court. 
We hold that neither the Constitution nor our pre-
vious cases leaves any room for doubt that Congress 
possesses the authority to regulate the distribution of 
alcoholic beverages by establishments such as The Blue 
Bull. 
IV 
The Court of Appeals said, however, that even if the 
Congres possessed authority to regulate The Blue Bull, 
it could not delega.te such authority to the Indian tribes. 
The court reasoned as follows: 
"The tribal members are citizens of the United 
States. It is difficult to see how such an association 
of citizens could exercise any degree of governmental 
authority or sovereignty over other citizens who do 
not belong, and who cannot participate in any way 
in the tribal organization. The situation is in no 
way comparable to a city, county, or special district 
under state laws. There cannot be such a seperate 
'nation' of United States citizens within the bound-
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other than as landowners, over individuals who are 
excluded as members. 
"The purported delegation of authority to the 
tribal officials contained in 18 U. S. C. § 1161 is 
therefore invalid. Congress cannot delegate its au-
thority to a private, voluntary organization, which 
is obviously not a governmental agency, to regulate 
a business on privately owned lands, no matter where 
located. It is obvious that the authority of Congress 
under the Constitution to regulate commerce with 
Indian Tribes is broad, but it cannot encompass the 
relationships here concerned." 487 F. 2d, at 19. 
This Court has recognized limits on the authority of 
Congress to delegate its legislative power. Panama Re-
fining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Those limita-
tions are, however, less stringent in cases where the entity 
exercising the delegated authority itself possesses inde-
pendent authority over the subject matter. United 
States v. Curtiss· Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-
322 (1936). Thus it is an important aspect of this case 
that Indjan tribes are unique aggregations possessing at-
tributes of sovereignty over both their members and 
their territory, Wore ester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 557 
(1832); they are "a separate people" possessing "the 
power of regulating their internal and social rela-
tions .... " United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 
381--382 (1886); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Comrn'n, 411 U. S. 164, 173 (1973). 
Cases such as Worcester, supra, and Kagama, supra, 
surely establish the proposition that Indian tribes within 
"Indian country" are a good deal more than "private, 
voluntary organizations," and they thus undermine the 
rationale of the Court of Appeals' decision. These same 
,., 
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cases in addition make clear that when Congress dele-
gated its authority to control the introduction of alco-
holic beverages into [ndian country, it did so to entities 
which possess a certain degree of independent authority 
over matters that affect the internal and social relations 
of tribal life. Clearly the distribution and use of intoxi-
cants is just such a matter. We need not decide whether 
this independent authority is itself sufficient for the 
Tribes to impose Ordinance No. 26. It is necessary only 
to state that the independent tribal authority is quite 
sufficient to protect Congress' decision to vest in tribal 
councils this portion of its own authority "to regulate 
Commerce ... with the Indian tribes." Cf. United States 
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., supra. 
The fact -that the Mazuries could not become members 
of the tribe, and therefore could not participate in the 
tribal government, does not alter our conclusion. This 
claim, that because respondents are non-Indians Congress 
could not subject them to the authority of the Tribal 
Council with respect to the sale of liquor, is answered by 
this Court's opinion in Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 
(1959). In holding that the a.uthority of tribal courts 
could extend over non-Indians, insofar as concerned their 
transactions on a reservation with Indians, we stated: 
"It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. 
He was on the Reservation and the transaction with 
an Indian took place there. [Citations omitted.] 
The cases in this Court have consistently guarded 
the authority of Indian governments over their reser-
vations. Congress recognized this authority in the 
Navajos in the Treaty of 1868, and has done so ever 
since. If this power is to be taken away from them, 
it is for Congress to do it. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 
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For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Court 
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